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At the start of March, the European Commission published a white paper ‘On the Future of Europe’.
Vivien Schmidt and Matt Wood assess the Commission’s proposals, arguing that while the
paper’s focus on differentiated integration is pragmatically useful under the current circumstances,
this strategy could exacerbate distrust in the EU if it is not accompanied by greater accountability
and transparency in decision-making.
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The European Commission’s new white paper ‘On the Future of Europe’ recognises how serious the EU’s crisis of
legitimacy is. Perhaps for the first time from the Commission itself, there is an acknowledgement that the Union
faces a number of options for its future, not merely involving greater integration but potentially a reigning in of
regulatory competences and a greater focus on areas where EU-level regulation works best. It even floats the option
of a movement back to solely focusing on the single market.
While assertively neutral on various options, the paper seems to support a multi-speed approach, with more
integration for member states who want it, and more opt outs for those who don’t. Our view is that this ‘differentiated’
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approach is pragmatically useful, but it carries a number of risks for transparency and accountability. Better inclusion
and openness for the public in EU decision-making must accompany any kind of differentiated integration, along with
further democratisation, if the EU wishes to rebuild the trust and legitimacy the white paper acknowledges it has lost.
The ‘democratic deficit’ – old problem, old solution?
Discussion about the EU’s ‘democratic deficit’ has been going on for decades, so the issues the white paper brings
up are not new. However, for the first time there seems to be a genuine recognition of the need for change. The
Commission’s discussion paper is remarkably candid about widespread public distrust of Brussels, stating for
example that ‘citizens’ trust in the EU has decreased in line with that for national authorities. Around a third of
citizens trust the EU today, when about half of Europeans did so ten years ago.’ Overcoming this trust issue will not
be easy, the white paper states: ‘Communities are not always aware that their farm nearby, their transport network
or universities are partly funded by the EU.’
At its heart, the white paper emphasises managing expectations as being critical for future success. Where the
Commission builds up expectations for economic growth and cross-border harmony driven from Brussels, it makes
itself vulnerable to attack. When suggesting faster and stronger integration as one option (the fifth and final), the
Commission notes ‘there is the risk of alienating parts of society which feel that the EU lacks legitimacy or has taken
too much power away from national authorities’. But at the other extreme, it makes clear that going back to the
single market alone is not a good (second) option. Moreover, its first option, going along pretty much as it currently
does, although presented very positively, is equally a non-starter, given the difficulties of reaching agreements under
the current unanimity rules.
Therefore, the more nuanced approaches the Commission itself seems to favour involving ‘differentiated integration’
– contained in especially the third but also the fourth options – would be preferable. This could involve, on the one
hand, some member states deepening cooperation in core policy areas while others stay on the sidelines, at least
initially. Or it could mean the Union focusing on what it does well and trying to do it better, while returning other
competences back to the member states.
The appeal of pragmatism
Differentiated Integration at this point may be an attractive and viable option to the Commission, given that deeper
integration seems to have hit a brick wall over the past five years as a result of member-state divisions over how to
respond to the EU’s ‘polycrisis’. It may be the easiest way to implement a solution as well. Allowing strongly pro-
European states to integrate further where possible makes good sense, in particular since different member-states
may prefer to integrate more (or less) in different areas.
One significant omission from the white paper is how such differentiated integration would work within existing
institutional arrangements. The original reason for harmonising policies at the EU level was to introduce clearer
accountability and transparency through consistent and clear decision making routes. Allowing member states to
pick and choose could damage core normative commitments to integration and fundamental rights, while at the
same time it could also create even more complexity and blurred lines. Moreover, enabling member states to speed
up integration in some areas, for example in fiscal policy, while permitting dis-integration in another, such as
immigration policy, potentially creates new unforeseen tensions, arguably even worse than those which exist at the
moment.
So how does the EU ensure accountability and transparency in a multi-speed Europe? The Commission does not
address this issue, despite its statement of concern. Accountability and transparency require clear and consistent
procedures with an obvious centre of authority to ensure accountability, or at least a clear ‘paper trail’ regarding who
made what decision, when and with what advice.
This is an issue the EU already struggles with. As some academics describe it, the EU faces an ‘accountability
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overload’ of reporting and paperwork, not to mention its lack of transparency or its democratic deficit. To deal with
these questions, it is also important to make certain that all member-states are sitting around the table, with a voice
if not always a vote, as new policy initiatives are considered. But even this is not enough.
The need for openness and inclusion
To address the problems of accountability as well as transparency, the EU needs to find ways to devise more
inclusive and open processes of public engagement at the European level, providing clear links into the policy
making process. In many respects, the EU is actually considered a normal and unproblematic part of people’s lives
across Europe. Common standards in food, medicines, aviation safety and other areas of EU responsibility are
largely supported by all relevant members of the public. The key, as the Commission itself in some ways notices, is
to make a connection in terms of identity at the local level, and to provide better and clearer channels of
engagement from national parliaments and local civil society.
Anyone who’s been to Brussels will tell you it is a ‘bubble’, perhaps even more so than national capitals often are.
Corporate lobbyists and NGOs abound, and ‘the public’ are left out of the equation. Paradoxically, there are various
ways the public can contribute in principle to EU legislation via online public consultations at various stages. Yet,
these processes are already obscure and monopolised by lobbyists – the ‘expert stakeholders’ EU bodies like to talk
about.
In some ways then, EU institutions are more transparent and accountable than their national counterparts. Yet,
there are few channels through which these institutions speak to the public. The European Citizens’ Initiative,
launched in 2012, is barely known across the continent and needs at least 1 million people to sign a petition for
anything useful to happen. Where there have been successful Initiatives, these have been monopolised by lobbyists
and NGOs.
The way to legitimacy
We recently interviewed a Dutch MEP who said that “the Commission works very well, the experts work well. But
where are the public?” His off-the-cuff solution was to have the Parliament take Committees and MEPs out of
Brussels and spend most of their time in local communities engaging with the public and learning about their issues
and opinions. This could be facilitated through national parliaments and promoted by political parties. All very
idealistic, and given recent populist developments we might be sceptical about its viability. But inclusion and
openness have to start somewhere.
For decades, academics and EU politicians assumed the ‘outputs’ the Union provides – economic stability and
social harmony – would be enough to secure ‘ever greater Union’. They have been proved wrong, but the solution is
not to reinforce the very obscurity and complexity that fuel distrust in Brussels in the first place. While a good start,
the Commission’s suggestion of more ‘differentiation’ could exacerbate rather than close the ‘expectations gap’ so
long as it does not find ways to ensure greater accountability and transparency. The EU needs to find ways to be
more democratic – open and inclusive – so as to allow the European public genuine participation in the process of
EU decision making, as it progresses through the Commission, Parliament and Council. Internal political reform is
remarkable for its absence in the white paper, but it will be crucial in any strategy to renew trust in the Union.
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics.
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